Situating Staley: Investigating the Constitutionality of Forcibly Medicating a Texas Death Row Inmate to Render Him Competent for Execution by Rusciano, Megan A.
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 21 | Issue 4 Article 5
2013
Situating Staley: Investigating the Constitutionality
of Forcibly Medicating a Texas Death Row Inmate
to Render Him Competent for Execution
Megan A. Rusciano
American University Washington College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rusciano, Megan A. "Situating Staley: Investigating the Constitutionality of Forcibly Medicating a Texas Death Row Inmate to Render
Him Competent for Execution." American University Journal of Gender Social Policy and Law 21, no. 4 (2013): 893-918.
 893 
SITUATING STALEY: INVESTIGATING 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
FORCIBLY MEDICATING A TEXAS 
DEATH ROW INMATE TO RENDER HIM 
COMPETENT FOR EXECUTION 
MEGAN A. RUSCIANO* 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................ 894 
II. Background ........................................................................................... 897 
 A. The Constitutional Foundation for the Forcible Medication 
of Death Row Inmates ............................................................. 897 
 1. The Eighth Amendment Protects an Inmate From 
Experiencing Cruel, Unusual, and Disproportionate 
Punishment. ....................................................................... 897 
 2. The Fourteenth Amendment Protects an Inmate’s Right 
to Bodily Integrity, Which Includes the Inmate’s Right 
to Make Decisions About His or Her Medical 
Treatment. .......................................................................... 899 
 B. The Controversy ......................................................................... 901 
 C. State v. Staley ............................................................................. 903 
III. Analysis ............................................................................................... 904 
 A. Forcibly Medicating Staley Constitutes Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Under the Eighth Amendment Because It Does 
Not Pass The Ford/Panetti Test. ............................................. 904 
  
                                                          
* Senior Staff, Vol. 22, American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & 
the Law; J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Dual Degree Program: American University 
Washington College of Law and University of Ottawa Law School; B.A. 2010, 
McGill University.  I would like to thank my parents and family—who inspire me 
to be more cognizant and continue to provide unwavering encouragement despite 
my incessant questions.  Many thanks to Professor Robert Dinerstein for his 
tireless editing and guidance, without which this paper likely would not have 
appeared in publication.  I am grateful for the help and input of the entire JGSPL 
staff throughout this process. Casey and D—thank you for the discursive support, 
safe harbor, and respite—you’ll always have my gratitude—all the hours. 
1
Rusciano: Situating Staley: Investigating the Constitutionality of Forcibly
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
894 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 21:4 
 
 1. Justice Powell’s Standard is the Appropriate Test to Use 
Under the Eighth Amendment Because the Supreme 
Court in Panetti Used This Standard for Its 
Competency Determination and State Legislatures 
Have Used the Standard to Formulate Their 
Competency Statutes. ........................................................ 905 
 2. Staley’s Competency Achieved by His Forced 
Medication Does Not Pass the Ford/Panetti 
Competency Test Because It Does Not Ensure That He 
Will Have a Rational Understanding of the Nature and 
Purpose of His Execution Nor Does It Comport with 
the Underlying Rationales Provided for This Test. ........... 905 
 3. Forcibly Medicating Staley to Render Him Competent 
For His Execution Does Not Serve a Retributive 
Purpose Because His Competency is Not Guaranteed 
and May Only Be Artificial. .............................................. 907 
 4. Forcibly Medicating Staley Violates the Prohibition 
Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment as Recognized 
in Ford Since It Deprives Him of His Dignity by 
Turning His Treatment into Additional and Arbitrary 
Punishment. ....................................................................... 908 
 B. Forcibly Medicating Staley to Render Him Competent for 
His Own Execution Violates His Fundamental Due Process 
Rights Ensured Under the Fourteenth Amendment Because 
It Is Not in His Best Medical Interest and Unjustifiably 
Violates His Bodily Integrity. .................................................. 911 
 1. Forcibly Medicating Staley Is Unconstitutional Because 
It Is Not in His Best Medical Interest to Be Forced to 
Receive Medication That May Result in His Death. ......... 912 
 2. Forcibly Medicating Staley Violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment Because It Greatly Infringes on Staley’s 
Bodily Integrity and Does Not Advance a Legitimate 
State Interest Because Life Without Parole Is an 
Alternative Punishment. .................................................... 914 
IV. Policy Implications .............................................................................. 918 
V. Conclusion ............................................................................................ 919 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Philosopher Michel Foucault stated that the State’s power to punish 
involves a power to discipline, which “regards individuals both as objects 
and as instruments of its exercise . . . . It is not a triumphant power . . . it is 
2
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a modest, suspicious power.”1  Foucault’s words about the State’s power 
reveal the tension within the question facing the Texas Criminal Court of 
Appeals: does the State have the power to force a death row inmate with 
mental illness2 to take medication which may render him competent for his 
own execution?3  The issue raises the question of who possesses the power 
over the treatment of an individual with mental illness and brings to the 
surface an underlying dilemma between mental illness and the legal 
system’s competency to address it.4 
Courts have struggled to define the scope of the constitutional 
protections that safeguard an inmate with mental illness.5  The Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the execution of an inmate who is unable to 
comprehend the reasoning for his or her execution in light of his or her 
mental illness.6  Still, this allows for an inmate who is diagnosed with a 
mental illness to face execution.  Moreover, while an inmate who has a 
mental illness has a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse 
medication, courts have had difficulty defining the scope of this right.7  A 
State’s interest in enforcing an inmate’s sentence must be weighed against 
the means of enforcing its interest since anti-psychotic medication provides 
no panacea for mental illness and may cause irreversible effects.8  This 
                                                          
 1. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 170 
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (describing the evolution of 
punishment from physical torture to discipline and control of a prisoner’s body). 
       2. Though the term psychosocial disability is preferable, this paper will use the 
older terminology of “mental illness” as both the medical community and the relevant 
case law use this terminology.  
 3. See Ex parte Staley, No. WR-37034-05, 2012 WL 1882267 at *1 (Tex. Crim. 
App. May 14, 2012) (staying Staley’s execution pending consideration of the 
constitutionality of his forced medication for execution). 
 4. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF 
INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 5-7 (Richard Howard trans., Vintage Books 1st ed. 
1988) (1965) (studying the treatment of patients with mental illness’s in institutions 
within a power analysis). 
 5. See generally Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the 
Death Penalty, and Human Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 257, 282 (2007) (noting that 
the criminal justice system fails to account for culpability during the crime, adequate 
defenses during trial, and the efficacy of post-conviction processes for individuals with 
mental illness). 
 6. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986). 
 7. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225-27 (1990) (favoring a 
state’s interest in safety over a dangerous inmate’s interest in its decisions to forcibly 
medicate the inmate); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983) (recognizing a 
committed patient’s Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse medication). 
 8. See generally THE CITIZENS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, 
THE SIDE EFFECTS OF COMMON PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS 20 (2012) [hereinafter CITIZENS 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS], available at 
3
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balancing test is further complicated when the State aims to enforce the 
death penalty.9  Courts struggle to establish an adequate balance in such 
circumstances and adopt conflicting notions of what constitutes an inmate’s 
best medical interest in regards to his or her treatment.10 
It is within this unsettled jurisprudence that the Staley case is situated.11  
Staley was convicted of capital murder, sentenced to death, and later 
diagnosed with schizophrenia.12  When medicated, Staley is considered by 
courts to be competent for execution, yet when unmedicated he is 
commonly considered to be incompetent for execution.  Absent medication, 
he at times believed that the judge convicted him and sentenced him to 
death as part of a plot to steal his one-of-a-kind red pickup truck.13  Staley 
also has a history of being treated with older medication, experiences 
undesirable effects from his medication, and often refuses to take this 
medication because of these effects.14  The issue is whether the State can 
force Staley to take this medication, which may render him competent for 
execution. 
This Comment argues Staley’s forcible medication violates the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments because it unjustifiably interferes with his 
right to bodily integrity and deprives him of his dignity.15  Part II of this 
                                                          
http://www.cchrint.org/pdfs/The_Side_Effects_of_Common_Psychiatric_Drugs.pdf 
(mentioning tardive dyskinesia, a potentially irreversible disorder that impairs basic 
motor functions and can cause involuntary movement of the lips, tongue, jaw, and 
fingers). 
 9. See Daniel N. Lerman, Second Opinion: Inconsistent Deference to Medical 
Ethics in Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1941, 1944, 1970 (2007) 
(addressing the ethical dilemma physicians face in these situations when they must 
consider the consequences of the clinical and legal realities of treatment). 
 10. Compare Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026-27 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that an inmate has an interest in receiving medication that alleviates his delusions), with 
State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747-48 (La. 1992) (holding that an inmate never has an 
interest in receiving medication that removes the barrier to his execution). 
 11. Ex parte Staley, No. WR-37034-05, 2012 WL 1882267 at *1 
(Tex. Crim. App. May 14, 2012). 
 12. See Brief for Appellant at app. A, at 31, Staley v. Texas, 233 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. 
Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2007) (No. AD-75-462) (noting in a physician’s testimony that 
Staley’s diagnosis did not occur until 1993, which was after his trial). 
 13. See id. at 25 (noting also the instance when Staley believed that Oprah Winfrey 
paid off the jury and that his victim was alive). 
 14. See Brief for Appellee at 13-14, Staley v. Texas, 233 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. Crim. 
App. Sept. 12, 2007) (No. AD-75-462) (detailing that, after receiving medication, 
Staley suffered paralysis, delusions, and extreme sedation, which led him to lie on the 
floor so long he wore a bald spot onto the back of his head). 
 15. See infra Part II (arguing that administering medication to Staley violates his 
recognized right to make decisions about his medical treatment). 
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Comment outlines the Eighth Amendment prohibition against executing an 
inmate who, due to mental illness, cannot understand the connection 
between his or her crime and punishment and the progression of the right to 
refuse medication.16  This Comment also describes the growing controversy 
around the issue of forcibly medicating an inmate just prior to his 
execution.17  Part III applies this constitutional analysis to Staley’s case and 
argues that his sentence should be commuted.18  Part IV finds that society 
has an interest in preserving the integrity of the medical community and in 
avoiding placing inmates in a situation wherein their medication’s 
effectiveness makes them eligible for forcible medication and execution.19  
Part V concludes that the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals should rule that 
Staley’s forcible medication is unconstitutional because it violates his 
dignity and bodily integrity.20 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Constitutional Foundation for the Forcible Medication of Death 
Row Inmates 
1. The Eighth Amendment Protects an Inmate From Experiencing Cruel, 
Unusual, and Disproportionate Punishment. 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are cruel and unusual 
because such punishments are either disproportionate to the crime 
committed or barbaric in nature.21  The Supreme Court held that executing 
an inmate who lacks a rational understanding of the imminence of his 
execution and the reasoning behind it constitutes cruel and unusual 
                                                          
 16. See id. (discussing the protections within the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and relevant case law defining when an inmate is competent for 
execution and can refuse medication). 
 17. See infra Part III (introducing the differing analyses the Singleton and Perry 
courts employed to determine whether forced medication for execution was in an 
inmate’s interest). 
 18. See id. (determining that, given the underlying rationales provided by the 
Supreme Court in forcible medication and competency for execution cases, Staley’s 
forcible medication violates constitutional protections). 
 19. See infra Part IV (arguing that rationales embedded in preserving medicine as a 
“healing art” and in protecting inmates’ dignity support Staley’s right to refuse 
medication). 
 20. See infra Part V (concluding that Staley’s forcible medication is 
unconstitutional and that commuting his sentence represents a viable alternative). 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) 
(articulating the view that the Eighth Amendment, grounded in the dignity of man, 
tempers the power of the court to punish “within the limits of civilized standards”). 
5
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punishment, and, thus, runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment’s protections.22 
Finding support in common law, the Court in Ford v. Wainwright held 
that executing an inmate who was unable to understand the reason for his 
execution due to his mental illness was cruel and unusual in part because 
no retributive purpose was served by his execution.23  The Court, in a 
plurality opinion, stated that it would offend societal decency to exact this 
“mindless vengeance” on an inmate as a punishment.24 
Because the majority opinion failed to define when an inmate could not 
be executed in this context, Justice Powell, in his concurrence, provided a 
standard to determine when an inmate was incompetent to be executed.25  
Here, an inmate is incompetent to be executed if the inmate is unable to 
understand: (1) the imminence of his or her execution and (2) the reason 
why he or she is being executed.26  Justice Powell also noted that an inmate 
could be executed only if the inmate was cured of his or her illness.27  
Although treatment and medication can control the symptoms of mental 
illness, mental illnesses are understood to have no cure.28 
Justice Powell’s standard for competency was widely accepted by state 
legislatures and used in Panetti v. Quarterman to determine whether 
Panetti, the inmate, was competent for execution.29  In Panetti, the Court 
                                                          
 22. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 403, 409-10 (1986) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that executing Ford was unconstitutional because his punishment inflicted 
suffering without understanding since he believed he owned the prisons, could control 
the Governor through mind waves, and would not be executed); see also Panetti v. 
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957-60 (2007) (clarifying that an inmate’s understanding of 
execution must be rational and not rooted in the manifestations of his illness). 
 23. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 403-04 (holding that Ford’s execution served no 
retributive purpose since Ford did not connect his execution to his crime and believed 
he was free to leave the prison whenever he wanted). 
 24. See id. at 409-10 (noting that executing an individual who was unable to 
understand his impending execution offended humanity); see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 
101 (finding that the Eighth Amendment’s protections evolve with “standards of 
decency”). 
 25. Ford, 477 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 26. See id. at 419-22 (using principles of dignity embedded in the Eighth 
Amendment to compose this definition of competency). 
 27. See id. at 425 n.5 (mentioning that certain inmates may permanently lose their 
mental faculties and thus may avoid execution altogether).  But see MD. CODE ANN., 
CORR. SERVS. § 3-904(b) (2004) (stating that an inmate is not incompetent if his 
competence is sustained by treatment). 
 28. See generally What Does Recovery Look Like, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL 
ILLNESS, http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=By_Illness (last visited January 
29, 2013) (noting that effective treatments, but not cures, exist for mental illnesses). 
 29. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954-55, 957-60 (2007) (clarifying 
that Ford’s safeguards also protected Panetti, who was convicted of murder, believed 
his victim was alive, and thought he was being executed to stop preaching); see also 
6
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held that Panetti’s mere awareness of the link between a crime and 
punishment was insufficient because it allowed the symptoms of Panetti’s 
illness, namely his delusions, to provide the basis for his competency.30  
Panetti’s punishment was stripped of its retributive purpose when he 
believed his execution was due to spiritual warfare and not due to his 
crime.31  As a result, the Court promulgated its test requiring that an inmate 
have a rational understanding of the imminence of his execution and the 
reasoning behind it.32 
2. The Fourteenth Amendment Protects an Inmate’s Right to Bodily 
Integrity, Which Includes the Inmate’s Right to Make Decisions About His 
or Her Medical Treatment. 
The Fourteenth Amendment safeguards an individual’s bodily integrity 
when the state attempts to violate the individual’s dignity and due process 
rights by unjustifiably infringing on his or her life or liberty.33  This 
protection extends to the right of an individual with mental illness to refuse 
treatment with anti-psychotic medication.34  Where inmates are concerned, 
the Supreme Court permits forcible medication only when: (1) an inmate is 
a danger to himself or others, (2) medication is medically appropriate, and 
(3) no less intrusive alternative is viable to serve an important state 
interest.35 
                                                          
Lyn Entzeroth, The Illusion of Sanity: The Constitutional and Moral Danger of 
Medicating Condemned Prisoners in Order to Execute Them, 76 TENN. L. REV. 641, 
646 (2009) (noting that many state competency statutes correspond to Ford’s standard). 
 30. See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 960 (noting that Panetti’s belief that his execution was 
a sham was a belief caused by his illness, not by a denial of his crime). 
 31. Id. at 959-61. 
 32. But see Debra Cassens Weiss, New Stay Granted for Inmate Claiming 
‘Grandiose Delusion’ Bars His Execution, ABA JOURNAL NEWS (Oct 24, 2012) 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new_stay_of_execution_granted_for_inmate_s
eeking_hearing_on_mental_health_i/ (discussing whether Panetti and Ford have been 
correctly applied in the ongoing case of John Ferguson, a Florida death row inmate 
who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, believes he is the Prince of God, and yet is 
poised to be executed). 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 
1983) (finding that anti-psychotic medication is dangerous and forcible medication 
violates bodily integrity); Michael Ashley Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1217 n.78 (2007) (citing Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach 
that finds that a state must ensure that an individual can “live a ‘truly human’ 
existence” by ensuring that he or she can exercise ten central capabilities including 
bodily integrity). 
 34. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that a patient 
can appreciate the risks and benefits of treatment, can refuse treatment, and is entitled 
to safeguards before being forcibly medicated). 
 35. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003) (requiring that the forced 
7
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This protection developed from the right of a patient with a mental 
illness in a hospital to be involved in his or her treatment decisions and 
refuse medication even when found incompetent.36  This safeguard was 
applied to prisoners in Washington v. Harper, when the Supreme Court 
held that Harper, an inmate with mental illness, could be forcibly 
medicated only when: (1) he was a danger to himself and others and (2) his 
treatment was medically appropriate.37  The Court emphasized that the 
State had a legitimate interest in forcibly medicating Harper since he was 
found to be dangerous absent medication.  Moreover, it also found that 
Harper’s forced medication was medically appropriate since a doctor 
ethically prescribed the medication solely for his treatment.38 
In Riggins v. Nevada, the Court applied the Harper standard to a trial 
competency context and emphasized evaluating a medication’s side effects 
within the medically appropriate prong of this standard.39  Riggins was 
forcibly medicated to stand trial and was later convicted of robbery and 
murder.40  The Court remanded the case, noting that medication could 
make a defendant appear overtly sedated and calm during the proceedings, 
which could influence a determination of guilt.41  Justice Kennedy, in his 
                                                          
medication analysis consider less intrusive alternatives that are likely to achieve a 
similar result); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1992) (finding medically 
appropriate treatment considers a medication’s side effects); Washington v. Harper, 
494 U.S. 210, 225-27 (1990) (asserting that an inmate may be forcibly medicated when 
he is a danger to himself or others and it is medically appropriate). 
 36. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 301 (1982) (recognizing that when 
found incompetent, a patient with a mental illness has the right to be involved in his 
treatment decisions through the substituted judgment standard).  The substituted 
judgment standard relies on the patient’s past preferences regarding medication to 
inform his treatment when found to be incompetent.  Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269 (holding 
that medication may only be forcibly administered to a committed patient when, in a 
physician’s professional judgment, the patient is dangerous). 
 37. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (finding the State’s interest was paramount 
because of Harper’s assault of a nurse). 
 38. See id. at 226-27 (noting that physicians can only prescribe medication for a 
patient’s treatment and that the American Psychological Association found that 
medication was effective in treating symptoms).  But see id. at 239 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (mentioning Harper’s statement that he would have rather died than taken 
his medication since it resulted in paralysis). 
 39. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137-38 (finding that a medication’s effects may 
influence a defendant’s ability to assist counsel and receive a fair trial). 
 40. See id. at 142-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that Riggins was strongly 
medicated with Mellaril, a drug that can severely depress basic motor and cognitive 
functions). 
 41. See id. at 134, 137-38 (majority opinion) (stating that Riggins’s medication 
could make him drowsy and confused, which could have an impact on his outward 
appearance, testimony, and examination). 
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concurrence, found that until effective drugs have minimal side effects, a 
defendant should only be forcibly medicated when it does not render his 
trial unfair.42  This concern, coupled with the potential of a medication’s 
serious effects, emphasizes the importance of requiring the state to 
demonstrate an important government interest before it can forcibly 
medicate an inmate.43 
Finally, in Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that only 
on rare occasions could an inmate with mental illness be forcibly medicated 
to stand trial.44  The Court remanded the case, noting that Sell’s forcible 
medication was not medically appropriate since it failed to consider the 
potential side effects of his medication and his alternative treatment 
options.45  The Court noted that the possibility of receiving alternative 
treatment in a mental health institution weighed against the state’s interest 
in prosecution.46  In return, the dissent argued that this possibility would 
cause defendants to engage in opportunistic behavior to manipulate their 
trials and avoid prosecution.47  Nonetheless, the test that was solidified in 
Sell found that Sell could be forcibly medicated only if he was dangerous, 
his medication was medically appropriate, and no less intrusive options 
were plausible to actually further the State’s important interest.48 
B. The Controversy 
Because the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of 
forcibly medicating inmates to render them competent for execution, lower 
                                                          
 42. Id. at 142-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 43. See id. at 135-36, 138 (majority opinion) (finding that although adjudication of 
a murder charge was an important interest, forced medication still needed to be the 
least intrusive means for this end); see also id. at 156 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding 
that this approach applied a strict scrutiny analysis). 
 44. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-81 (2003).  
 45. See id. at 179 (citing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Riggins acknowledging 
medication’s dangerous side effects but also noting that if Sell’s medication was 
authorized due to his dangerousness, the need to justify authorization on other grounds 
would be less important); see also United States v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731, 748 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (relying on this justification in Sell for forcibly medicating a prisoner 
because he is dangerous to justify forcibly medicating Jared Loughner). 
 46. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81 (finding that the State’s interest in bringing the 
accused to trial is essential for justice, but a consideration of an inmate’s interest given 
his medical interest is necessary). 
 47. See id. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that criminals could disrupt 
proceedings by conveniently not taking medication for their benefit). 
 48. See generally Jeremy P. Burnette, The Supreme Court “Sells” Charles 
Singleton Short: Why the Court Should Have Granted Certiorari to Singleton v. Norris 
After Reversing United States v. Sell, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 551 (2004) (defining 
the standard for forcible medication after Sell). 
9
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courts have reached divergent conclusions on this constitutional issue.49  
One interpretation emerged from State v. Perry, where the Louisiana 
Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to forcibly medicate Perry, 
a death row inmate, solely for the purpose of executing him.50  The court 
found that forcibly medicating Perry violated Louisiana’s constitution since 
it rendered treatment a punishment with added indignity.51  The court noted 
that Perry’s physician had conflicting responsibilities to the state and to 
Perry, which left room for the physician to make arbitrary decisions about 
Perry’s treatment options.52  The physician had to determine whether the 
treatment provided to Perry for his illness could be separated from the 
reality that this treatment would hasten his execution.  If the physician 
decided this was possible, he or she may violate the Hippocratic Oath when 
treatment meant to alleviate suffering contributes to a punishment that 
results in death.53  The court also reasoned that indignity was added to 
punishment since Perry would be cognizant of the violation of his bodily 
integrity for his execution.54  The court determined that when achieved 
through his forced medication, Perry’s competency addressed the 
symptoms of his illness rather than curing his illness and thus did not pass 
Ford’s constitutional threshold for competency.55 
Furthermore, the court held that Perry’s forced medication was not 
medically appropriate since it did not allow him to discuss his treatment 
                                                          
 49. Compare Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that an inmate’s forcible medication is not unconstitutional when his execution date is 
pending), with State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747-48 (La. 1992) (holding that forcibly 
medicating an inmate and carrying out his execution thereafter was unconstitutional), 
and Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 56, 61 (S.C. 1993) (applying the American Bar 
Association’s standard for competency to find forcible medication unconstitutional). 
 50. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 771. 
 51. Id. at 750. 
 52. See id. at 752-53 (finding that, in this situation, a physician cannot use 
“informed and dispassionate professional judgment”). 
 53. See id. at 752-55 (adding that this scheme also undermined the basic trust of the 
physician-patient relationship); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242, 274 
(1972) (holding that one of the markers of cruel and unusual punishment is the arbitrary 
infliction of punishment); AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL 
AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS, E-2.06 
Capital Punishment (2000) [hereinafter AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND 
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS], available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-
resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion206.page? (finding that the 
Hippocratic Oath prevents doctors from rendering an inmate competent for execution 
who was found incompetent). 
 54. See Perry, 610 at 763 (stating this scheme turned Perry’s life into a means for 
the state’s ends). 
 55. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 759. 
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with a physician acting in his best medical interest.56  The court found that 
the state could not separate its interest in medicating and treating Perry 
from its underlying goal of executing him.57  Perry’s own death could never 
be in his best medical interest and therefore, Perry’s forced medication was 
unconstitutional.58 
Yet, in Singleton v. Norris, the Eighth Circuit held that Singleton, an 
inmate convicted of murder, could be forcibly medicated when his 
execution date was pending.59  The court reasoned that medicating 
Singleton was constitutional since the medication alleviated his delusions, 
caused no serious effects, and allowed Singleton to understand the 
connection between his crime and punishment.60 
The court distinguished its holding from Perry on two grounds: (1) Perry 
applied Louisiana law and (2) Perry found, within the medically 
appropriate analysis, that the defendant’s treatment could not be separated 
from his punishment.61  The Singleton court maintained that Singleton’s 
own interest in taking medication to abate his symptoms, coupled with the 
state’s significant interest in enforcing his sentence, rendered his forced 
medication constitutional.62 
C. State v. Staley 
 In 1991, Steven Staley was convicted of robbery and murder, sentenced 
to death, and later diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. Since then, 
Staley has been partially compliant with taking his medication.63  Staley 
experiences adverse effects from his medication and the medication alone 
has proven ineffective in treating his illness.64  In 2006, he was forcibly 
                                                          
 56. Id. at 768. 
 57. See id. at 761 (emphasizing that discussions of Perry’s treatment were only 
centered on his competency and thus on removing the barrier preventing his execution). 
 58. But see id. at 780 (Cole, J., dissenting) (finding that a state’s interest in 
protecting society from murderers seeking to avoid punishment by feigning illness 
could render forced medication in this instance constitutional). 
 59. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 60. But see id. at 1031 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (mentioning that, while medicated, 
Singleton believed he was under a voodoo curse that turned his food into worms). 
 61. Id. at 1026 (majority opinion). 
 62. See id. at 1024-25 (relying on the Eighth Circuit’s emphasis in Sell that Sell’s 
forced medication was justified to bring him to trial).  But see Burnette, supra note 48, 
at 541-43 (arguing that because at the time Singleton was decided the Supreme Court 
had granted certiorari to and later reversed Sell, Singleton was wrongly decided). 
 63. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 15 (noting Staley’s protests about 
taking his medication due to its effects). 
 64. See id. at 14 (noting that after being medicated with Haldol, Staley has 
experienced paralysis and continued delusions). 
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medicated for his execution.65  Yet, his execution was repeatedly stayed 
and continues to be appealed due to the debate over the constitutionality of 
his forced medication.66 
Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Staley cannot be executed 
if he does not understand (1) the imminence of his execution and (2) the 
reasoning for his execution.67  Yet, the Staley case emerges from a 
jurisdiction where courts have been slow to enforce Panetti’s safeguards 
and where several inmates with mental disabilities have recently been 
executed.68  From this context, it is uncertain whether a Texas court will 
find that forcibly medicating Staley on the eve of his execution is 
constitutional.69 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Forcibly Medicating Staley Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Under the Eighth Amendment Because It Does Not Pass The Ford/Panetti 
Test. 
Forcibly medicating Staley violates the Eighth Amendment because his 
forcible medication: (1) would result in a medication-induced competency 
that does not conform with the Supreme Court’s competency requirement, 
(2) would not further a retributive purpose, and (3) would conflict with 
evolving standards of decency by turning his treatment into additional and 
                                                          
 65. Staley v. State, 233 S.W.3d 337, 337  (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 
 66. Ex parte Staley, 2012 WL 1882267, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. May 14, 2012). 
 67. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.05 (West 2007). 
 68. See Vidisha Barua, Synthetic Sanity: A Way Around the Eighth Amendment?, 
44 CRIM. L. BULL. 4, 8 (2008) (noting that from 2003 to 2005, Texas executed three 
inmates with mental illness); see also Martiya Karimjee, Marvin Wilson Execution 
Goes Ahead in Texas Despite Claims of Low IQ, GLOBAL POST (August 8, 2012) 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/united-
states/120808/marvin-wilson-execution-goes-ahead-texas-despite (last visited February 
1, 2013) (addressing Texas’s recent execution of an individual with an intellectual 
disability). 
 69. See Green v. State, 374 S.W.3d 434, 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding that 
the fact that a defendant claimed that he was innocent of his crime indicated that he 
understood the reasoning for his execution and even though the record presented 
evidence of his incompetency, this understanding was sufficient to find him competent 
under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure). In light of this case the parties to the 
Staley case were required to submit briefs partially on the question of whether the 
forcible medication issue was under review under the Texas Code of Criminal 
Procedure.  Staley’s brief asserts what his claims are and also presents an argument that 
Staley’s forcible medication renders him in state wherein he is incompetent to be 
executed under the Atkins v. Virginia standard.  Brief for Appellant, at 15, Ex parte 
Staley, 2012 WL 6729419 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2012) (No. AP-76798). 
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arbitrary punishment.70  Reaching this conclusion requires the application 
of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to the Staley case to determine 
whether Staley’s understanding passes the Supreme Court’s threshold for 
competency.  The controversy in this case revolves around whether Staley 
merely must achieve a rational understanding of his execution, or whether 
the means of achieving this understanding must pass the Supreme Court’s 
standard for competency.71 
1. Justice Powell’s Standard is the Appropriate Test to Use Under the 
Eighth Amendment Because the Supreme Court in Panetti Used This 
Standard for Its Competency Determination and State Legislatures Have 
Used the Standard to Formulate Their Competency Statutes. 
Though Ford’s competency standard is found in Justice Powell’s 
concurrence, it is the appropriate standard for the Eighth Amendment 
analysis of this forcible medication issue.  Justice Powell’s standard not 
only corresponds to the majority’s holding that executing an inmate who 
does not understand why he is to die is unconstitutional, but was also 
incorporated into numerous state competency statutes.72  Additionally, in 
2007, the Supreme Court in Panetti clarified Justice Powell’s definition of 
competency, which underscores that Justice Powell’s test remains the 
relevant standard for this Eighth Amendment analysis.73 
2. Staley’s Competency Achieved by His Forced Medication Does Not Pass 
the Ford/Panetti Competency Test Because It Does Not Ensure That He 
Will Have a Rational Understanding of the Nature and Purpose of His 
Execution Nor Does It Comport with the Underlying Rationales Provided 
for This Test.  
Forcing Staley to take medication that may render him competent for 
execution violates the Eighth Amendment.  The treatment of Staley’s 
illness reveals his history of adverse effects from medication and has not 
                                                          
 70. Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 15.  
 71. Compare Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (focusing on 
whether Singleton would achieve Ford competency under the Eighth Amendment as it 
was decided before Panetti), with State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747-48 (La. 1992) 
(focusing on whether the means by which Perry achieved competency violated the 
Eighth Amendment). 
 72. See generally Entzeroth, supra note 29, at 646 (mentioning among others 
Oregon’s competency statute, which states that a death warrant may not be issued until 
a defendant understands the reason for his execution). 
 73. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 932 (2007) (using Justice Powell’s 
concurrence in Ford to find that a rational understanding was part of the definition of 
awareness). 
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ensured his competency.74  Furthermore, the effects of medication, which 
were acknowledged in Riggins to influence Riggins’s ability to assist his 
counsel and participate in his trial, can also influence Staley’s 
understanding of and participation in his execution.75  Staley’s experience 
of extreme lethargy, apathy, and catatonia after being forcibly medicated 
make it unlikely that the competency he receives thereafter satisfies the 
safeguards established by Ford and Panetti.76 
Indeed, the Singleton court’s reliance on medication as the ultimate 
remedy for incompetency for execution is contrasted by the Perry court’s 
determination that medication-induced competency is artificial and does 
not pass the Ford competency test.77  The flaw in the Singleton reasoning is 
in its failure to consider the underpinnings of Ford’s competency test, 
namely an execution’s retributive value and the opportunity for an inmate 
to prepare for his death.78  That Ford believed he could not be executed 
because he could control the Governor through mind waves reinforced the 
view that he did not connect his execution to his crime and would not be 
able to meaningfully prepare for his death.79  Similarly, evidence shows 
that Staley when unmedicated believed he was convicted because the judge 
wanted to steal his pickup truck and, when medicated, experienced adverse 
effects and may require different doses of medication so he can achieve 
competency.80  These facts reinforce the view that even if Staley can 
                                                          
 74. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 12-13 (noting that Staley experienced 
hallucinations while medicated). 
 75. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134-38 (1992) (noting that Riggins’s 
medication could have made him suffer from confusion and affected his testimony); 
Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 14 (mentioning the powerful nature of Staley’s 
medication, which left him in a catatonic stupor).  See generally Mahendra T. Bhati et 
al., Clinical Manifestations, Diagnosis, and Empirical Treatments for Catatonia, 4 
PSYCHIATRY 46 (2007), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2922358 (noting that catatonic stupors 
depress an individual’s motor functions leaving him motionless and commonly mute, 
and that catatonia is a symptom of certain types of schizophrenia, which can also be 
exacerbated by certain medications, including Haldol). 
 76. Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 21-22. 
 77. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 759 (La. 1992) (finding that antipsychotic 
medications induce artificial competency because they do not cure but rather calm and 
mask the symptoms of mental illness). 
 78. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(stating that no retributive purpose is served if an inmate is aware of his execution’s 
imminence but not why it is to occur). 
 79. See id. at 410 (majority opinion). 
 80. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 14, at app. A, at 18 (mentioning, in 
physician’s testimony, concern that Staley’s condition was deteriorating and that 
walking into his execution he may no longer be aware of the connection between his 
crime and punishment). 
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connect his crime and punishment he will be denied the opportunity to 
meaningfully prepare for his execution. 
Hence, Singleton’s finding that competency achieved by forced 
medication is constitutional does not comport with Panetti’s interpretation 
of Ford.  In Panetti, decided after Perry and Singleton, the Court 
recognized that a test for competency that ignored Panetti’s ability to 
rationally appreciate and understand the connection between his crime and 
punishment before he confronts his execution was unconstitutional.81  
Likewise, a test for competency that ignores that to rationally appreciate 
and understand the connection between his crime and punishment, Staley 
must be forced to take medication that can affect the clarity of his cognitive 
ability prior to his execution is similarly unconstitutional.  While the 
Panetti Court’s failure to delineate what constitutes a rational 
understanding reveals a key flaw in its mental health capital punishment 
law, its clarification of Ford should be interpreted to also protect an inmate 
who cannot be assured to achieve a rational understanding absent 
medication and who is forced to take medication that could impact how he 
confronts his execution.82  In light of these safeguards, Staley’s competency 
achieved after he is forcibly medicated does not comport with the 
underlying rationales of Ford and Panetti. 
3. Forcibly Medicating Staley to Render Him Competent For His Execution 
Does Not Serve a Retributive Purpose Because His Competency is Not 
Guaranteed and May Only Be Artificial. 
Forcibly medicating Staley to establish his competency for execution is 
unconstitutional because it would not fulfill a basic purpose of enforcing 
the death penalty: retribution.  The Singleton and Perry courts present two 
divergent rationales on this issue.  Whereas the Singleton court found that 
the retributive goals of the death penalty are served when an inmate 
understands the link between his crime and punishment, the Perry court 
found that competency achieved by forced medication did not fulfill this 
goal.83 
Yet, consider the Supreme Court’s rationale in Panetti.  The Court found 
                                                          
     81.   Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957-60 (2007). 
 82. See Bonnie, supra note 5, at 283 (suggesting that Panetti’s inability to fully 
define rational understanding exposes the Court’s failure to clarify its mental health 
capital sentencing jurisprudence). 
 83. Compare Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that the state’s interest in enforcing Singleton’s sentence was served when he was 
aware of the nature and purpose of his punishment), with State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 
746, 747-48 (La. 1992) (holding that the state’s enforcement of Perry’s sentence was 
unconstitutional when Perry’s awareness of the nature and purpose of his punishment 
was the effect of his forced medication). 
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that Panetti’s illness caused him to believe that his victim was still alive 
and that his execution was part of spiritual warfare, which differed greatly 
from the rationale of the state’s punishment for his crime.84  Similarly, 
executing Staley, who, because of his illness, believes his execution is due 
to the judge’s desire for his pickup truck, and will likely be medicated to 
understand the rationale for his punishment, is unconstitutional.85  This is 
because given Staley’s history of experiencing adverse effects after being 
medicated, it is uncertain whether Staley’s understanding of his execution 
when he is medicated meaningfully corresponds to the rationale of those 
seeking his punishment.86  Executing Panetti, who lacked a rational 
understanding of his execution due to his illness was unconstitutional and 
lacked a retributive effect.  Similarly, Staley likely has to be medicated to 
attain such a rational understanding, may experience catatonia after 
receiving medication, and could be subject to changes in medication to 
maintain this understanding. This reality does not comport with Ford’s 
rationale that an inmate have an opportunity to appreciate the imminence 
and purpose of his punishment prior to execution for his execution to serve 
a retributive purpose.87  Thus, forcibly medicating Staley on the eve of his 
execution does not advance the state’s retributive goal. 
4. Forcibly Medicating Staley Violates the Prohibition Against Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment as Recognized in Ford Since It Deprives Him of His 
Dignity by Turning His Treatment into Additional and Arbitrary 
Punishment. 
Forcibly medicating Staley to render him competent for execution 
inflicts an additional and arbitrary punishment.  The Eighth Amendment’s 
protection of human dignity safeguards an inmate’s ability to prepare for 
his or her death and protects the inmate from society’s attempts to exact 
additional punishment from him or her.88  The Singleton and Perry courts 
again approached this issue by employing two different rationales.  
Whereas the Singleton court found that Singleton did not experience 
additional punishment since being medicated was in his medical interest, 
the Perry court found that such a scheme stripped Perry of his dignity and 
                                                          
      84. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959-60. 
 85. Brief for Appellee, supra note 14, at app. A, at 8-9. 
 86. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 14-15 (arguing that leading a heavily-
medicated and stoned Staley to death serves no retributive purpose). 
 87. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 88. See id. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that it is unconstitutional to 
execute an individual who does not have an opportunity to prepare “mentally and 
spiritually” for his death); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (finding 
that the state’s power to punish an inmate is limited by the Eighth Amendment’s 
protection of civilized standards of decency). 
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inflicted arbitrary punishment.89  The difference between these two views 
centers upon whether the court finds that treatment can be separated from 
punishment or whether both of these state motives are entwined. 
Indeed, in Perry, the court found that instead of suffering the mere 
extinguishment of his life, Perry’s forcible medication turned his life into a 
means for the state’s ends by forcing treatment upon him that would 
become the means to, and the mere preparation for, his death.90  The court 
noted that seeking to disguise as medical treatment what was solely an 
attempt to render Perry competent for execution was an additional and 
arbitrary punishment.91  Nonetheless, the Singleton court found that a 
treatment, which abates delusion, was in Singleton’s interest and, thus, was 
not a punishment.92 Thus, unlike the Perry court, the Singleton court 
approached this issue by recognizing Singleton’s short-term medical 
interest in treatment as separate from his punishment. 
While Staley’s execution is a lawfully imposed punishment and Staley 
has an interest in any respite medication may provide, the Eighth 
Amendment protects Staley’s dignity.  Staley’s medication is, at times, 
effective in treating the symptoms of his illness, and yet his treatment has 
centered on medicating him with older anti-psychotic drugs to render him 
competent for execution.93  Thus, framing Staley’s treatment with 
medication as beneficial, when it involves older medication, is addressed 
primarily in terms of whether it will render him competent and not on its 
potential effects, and ultimately is administered against his will, exacts the 
additional and arbitrary punishment Ford warned is prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment.94  Here, a treatment framed and discussed in terms of 
competency is a treatment for Staley that is not separated from his 
punishment. 
Moreover, the Perry court held that turning treatment into punishment 
                                                          
 89. Compare Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
that if an inmate concedes that medication is effective in abating the symptoms of his 
illness then its forcible administration prior to his execution is not unconstitutional), 
with State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 766 (La. 1992) (reinforcing the view that forcibly 
medicating Perry stripped him of control over his mind prior to his execution). 
 90. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 768. 
 91. Id. at 766. 
 92. Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1026. 
 93. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 14, at 3 (noting Staley’s medication with the 
anti-psychotic drug Haldol, which is an older anti-psychotic drug); see also, CITIZENS 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 23 (mentioning the FDA alert that 
patients treated intravenously or in high doses with Haldol experienced heart 
abnormalities and death). 
 94. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (finding that the Eighth 
Amendment protects against society exacting vengeance on an inmate). 
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violated the integrity of the medical community, which led to arbitrary 
punishment, an issue not considered in Singleton.95  The forcible 
medication of an inmate for execution requires a physician’s conflicting 
loyalty to his or her patients when the physician must choose between 
assuaging a patient’s symptoms through medication that could result in the 
patient’s execution or allowing the patient to suffer from the symptoms of 
the patient’s illness.96  The Perry court warned that punishments could be 
arbitrarily enforced when physicians weigh these interests.97  Indeed, this 
punishment was arbitrary in Singleton because it rested in part upon a 
determination that Singleton’s good fortune of not experiencing many 
effects to his medication implied that medication was in his best medical 
interest.98  Nonetheless, while Staley has benefited from medication, he 
also has experienced its side effects, which allows his physicians to make 
arbitrary decisions about his treatment.  Such “treatment” results in 
arbitrary punishment and reveals the flaw in the Singleton court’s rationale. 
Furthermore, under Harper, medication cannot be prescribed for any 
reason other than medical treatment.99  Yet, in Staley’s case, the state has 
largely focused on addressing Staley’s treatment in terms of medicating 
him for competency proceedings, revealing that it has not separated 
treatment from punishment.100  Moreover, the medical community has 
indicated that it finds forcibly medicating an inmate when it will render 
him competent for execution to constitute a punishment.101  The American 
Medical Association (AMA) and the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA) both condemned a physician’s involvement in this practice.102  
Thus, if one defers to the standards of the medical community, forcibly 
medicating prisoners constitutes a punishment, which violates the Eighth 
                                                          
 95. See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 752 (stating that while the Hippocratic Oath requires 
that a physician alleviate suffering and do no harm, the State’s forcible medication 
order involves an active participation in execution). 
 96. Lerman, supra note 9, at 1944. 
 97. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 752-53. 
 98. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003). But see id. at 1031 
(Heaney, J., dissenting) (mentioning that even when medicated Singleton experienced 
delusions). 
 99. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S 210, 222 n.8 (1990) (noting that Harper’s 
medication was in his interest because it was ethically prescribed by a doctor). 
 100. Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 21-22. 
 101. See Lerman, supra note 9, at 1969, 1973 (discussing the state’s interest in the 
integrity of the medical profession, which needs to allow physicians to balance the 
consequences of all treatment options, including non-treatment). 
 102. See id. at 1945, 1950, 1974 (noting that although membership to the APA or 
AMA is not required to practice medicine, both organizations modified their policies to 
find forcibly medicating death row inmates unethical). 
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Amendment. 
Indeed, if such a scheme can be found constitutional and the state has the 
power to deny Staley the ability to control his bodily integrity and 
treatment by forcibly medicating him, one is left to wonder where the line 
protecting individuals under the Eighth Amendment remains.103  A death 
row inmate has acquired the opportunity to choose his last meal, his 
method of execution in some states, and ultimately his final words, yet the 
forcible medication scheme deprives Staley of this conception of choice 
about how he confronts his treatment and own death by forcing him to take 
medication against his will.104  Such a punishment is categorically different 
from and disproportionate to another’s punishment and resembles the kind 
of “mindless vengeance” Justice Marshall warned violates the Eighth 
Amendment.105  Framing Staley’s treatment in terms of competency, 
allowing for arbitrary decisions to be made about this treatment, and 
denying Staley a choice about whether he receives the treatment turns his 
treatment into an unconstitutional punishment.106 
B. Forcibly Medicating Staley to Render Him Competent for His Own 
Execution Violates His Fundamental Due Process Rights Ensured under 
the Fourteenth Amendment Because It Is Not in His Best Medical Interest 
and Unjustifiably Violates His Bodily Integrity. 
The Supreme Court held that an inmate may be forcibly medicated only 
when (1) he is a danger to himself or others, (2) medication is medically 
appropriate, meaning it is medically ethical and in the inmate’s best 
interest, and (3) no viable less intrusive alternatives exist that will actually 
further an important state interest.107  The difference between the Perry and 
Singleton decisions focused upon the courts’ interpretations of the second 
prong of this test, namely whether it could be seen as medically appropriate 
                                                          
 103. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (emphasizing the Eighth 
Amendment’s protection of human dignity). 
 104. See Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 
IOWA L. REV. 319, 378 (1997) (stating that some states allow a prisoner to choose 
between lethal injections and other methods of execution); see also Bonnie, supra note 
5, at 277 (arguing that the ability to prepare and choose how one confronts death is 
inherent in the Eighth Amendment protections and delineated in Ford and Trop). 
 105. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10. 
 106. See id. (holding that executing an inmate whose illness prevented him from 
understanding why he was to die was unconstitutional because it offered no capacity 
for the inmate to come to terms with his conscience, and offended human decency and 
dignity). 
 107. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178-79 (2003) (applying this 
constitutional standard in an analysis of whether to forcibly medicate a defendant for 
trial). 
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and in an inmate’s best interest to be forcibly medicated in light of his 
approaching execution date.108  This discussion invokes questions 
regarding whether treatment can be separated from punishment and 
whether it can ever be in an inmate’s interest to receive medication that 
may lead to his or her death.  The third prong of the test, which weighs the 
State’s interest against less intrusive alternatives, was also a point of 
controversy between the Perry and Singleton courts.109  In light of the 
Supreme Court’s analysis, Staley’s forcible medication prior to his 
execution is unconstitutional because: (1) it is not in his best medical 
interest to be forced to receive treatment that may result in his death and (2) 
it deprives him of bodily integrity absent a legitimate state interest.110 
1. Forcibly Medicating Staley Is Unconstitutional Because It Is Not in His 
Best Medical Interest to Be Forced to Receive Medication That May Result 
in His Death. 
The Court in Harper held that the state had an interest in preserving 
safety in the prison environment; however, the Court also found that forced 
medication is only constitutional when it is ethically prescribed by a doctor 
for treatment.111  Since that ruling, when confronted with the medically 
appropriate analysis, the Riggins and Sell Courts emphasized the dangers 
associated with anti-psychotic medication and an individual’s liberty 
interest in refusing medication.112  The Court sees both of these concerns as 
important in evaluating whether forced medication is in an individual’s best 
medical interest. 
Thus, when analyzing whether forcible medication was in a death row 
inmate’s best medical interest, the Perry court viewed treatment as 
medically appropriate if it comported with medical ethics and sustained 
                                                          
 108. Compare Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that 
forcible medication is in the inmate’s best medical interest if it alleviates his delusions), 
with State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 761 (La. 1992) (noting that forcibly medicating 
Perry prior to his execution could never be in his best medical interest). 
 109. Compare Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1026 (highlighting the state’s important 
interest in administering Singleton’s sentence and that Singleton likely could not be 
rendered competent through other means), with Perry, 610 So. 2d at 761 (noting the 
second prong of the analysis could never be fulfilled because of the state’s ultimate 
interest in executing Perry). 
 110. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S 210, 225-26, 250 (1990) (finding that 
forced medication still must be in the inmate’s best medical interest despite a state’s 
interest in preserving prison safety); see also Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300-01 
(1982), remanded 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984) (acknowledging that a patient with mental 
illness has a constitutional right to be involved in his or her treatment decisions). 
 111. Harper, 494 U.S at 226. 
 112. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179; Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992). 
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Perry’s life.113  However, there are situations when taking medication that 
may hasten death may be in an individual’s best medical interest, including 
receiving chemotherapy as a terminally ill cancer patient.114  While it is 
difficult to surmise that it is in Staley’s best medical interest to receive 
treatment prescribed by a physician who is acting arbitrarily when he or she 
administers medication, it is in Staley’s interest to experience the relief 
medication may provide him.  Here, if Staley’s treatment is separated from 
his punishment, it could be argued that it is in Staley’s best medical interest 
to receive medication even though it may hasten his death.  Indeed, the 
Singleton court argued that it was in Singleton’s interest to take medication 
that would alleviate his delusions and, which he agreed absent his 
impending execution date, was in his interest to take.115  Additionally, 
because the Perry court did not establish how much weight should be given 
to a state’s interest if an inmate is found to be dangerous, it is uncertain 
whether Staley’s medication could be justified on other grounds.116  Thus, 
the Perry and Singleton courts again took divergent approaches towards 
this issue. 
Nevertheless, though medication is certainly an integral part of Staley’s 
treatment, it is difficult to argue that his treatment is medically appropriate 
if the physicians prescribing the treatment are prohibited by both the APA 
and the AMA from administering it.117  Indeed, even if Staley is found to 
be dangerous or if it is in his interest to receive medication, which could 
hasten his death, under the Harper standard it is not medically appropriate 
to receive unethical medical treatment.118 
However, ultimately this issue comes down to the question of choice, 
which was recognized as the right of an individual with a mental illness to 
refuse dangerous and invasive medication and to be involved in his or her 
treatment decisions.119  While there are situations in which an individual 
may choose to receive medication that might hasten his or her death, the 
                                                          
 113. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 752, 761. 
 114. Lerman, supra note 9, at 1944, 1947. 
 115. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003) (majority opinion). 
 116. See id. at 1036 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (noting that by tying Perry’s medication 
to the State’s goal of retribution, the court presumed the state only had one motive). 
 117. See generally Lerman, supra note 9, at 1945, 1969 (noting that both the AMA 
and APA disallow physicians to administer medication to inmates whose execution 
rests on his or her forcible medication). 
 118. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S 210, 214 (1990). 
 119. See Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that a patient with 
mental illness can appreciate the benefits and risks of medication and should be 
involved in his or her treatment plan); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 268 (3d Cir. 
1983) (recognizing a committed patient’s right to refuse medication). 
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crucial element here is that of choice.120 
Staley cannot choose to avoid his punishment; however, depriving him 
of his right to make decisions about his medical treatment after his 
conviction subjects him to an imposition of the state’s power absent the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s protections.121  Here, given that the importance of 
considering the actual impact of medication on the individual and the 
individual’s own medical interest were affirmed in Riggins and Sell, the 
fact that an inmate, as in Singleton, consents or does not strongly protest 
medication at one time should not mean that he does not have a right to 
refuse it at another.122  The conception of treatment, not punishment, 
involves the ability to make decisions that at times medication is 
appropriate and at others it is not.  This recognition ultimately protects 
Staley’s bodily integrity.  Indeed, given Staley’s medical history of 
experiencing side effects to medication, the potential ineffectiveness of his 
medication in treating his illness, and his treatment with older medication, 
his choice regarding his treatment seems to be of greater importance.123  
Recognizing the importance of subjectivity in the treatment process, it is 
Staley’s choice about whether he wants to receive medication prior to his 
execution that prevents his treatment from becoming punishment and in 
this context ensures that medication is in his interest.124  Depriving Staley 
of this choice about his bodily integrity just prior to his execution 
reinforces the view that his treatment has become a punishment that 
appears to be an even more cruel and unusual violation of the Eighth 
Amendment. 
2. Forcibly Medicating Staley Violates the Fourteenth Amendment Because 
It Greatly Infringes on Staley’s Bodily Integrity and Does Not Advance a 
                                                          
 120. See Bonnie, supra note 5, at 277 (arguing that choice prior to execution is 
pivotal to the inmate not becoming a means to the State’s retributive ends); see also 
Associated Press, Oregon Judge Allows Condemned Man to Reject Reprieve from 
Governor, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 3, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/04/us/oregon-
judge-allows-condemned-man-to-reject-reprieve-from-governor.html?src=recg (noting 
a judge’s ruling that an Oregon inmate even has the right to reject the Governor’s 
clemency). 
 121. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22 (emphasizing that imprisonment does not 
authorize the state to subject an inmate to involuntary treatment without affording him 
additional due process rights). 
 122. See generally Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003) (stating that 
determining what is medically appropriate should consider the impact of the 
medication on the individual in light of its effects and the individual’s medical interest). 
 123. Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 14. 
 124. See generally Rogers, 738 F.2d at 6, 9 (recognizing the right of an individual 
with mental illness to be involved in his or her treatment analysis, even when he or she 
is found to be incompetent). 
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Legitimate State Interest Because Life Without Parole Is an Alternative 
Punishment. 
Forcibly medicating Staley to render him competent for execution 
violates his bodily integrity absent actually furthering a legitimate state 
interest.  Neither the Singleton nor the Perry court denied the invasive and 
potentially dangerous nature of anti-psychotic medication.125  In fact, the 
Perry court underscored the invasive nature of medication and its forcible 
administration prior to execution.126  Yet, the Perry and Singleton courts 
again placed different weight on the inmate’s interest in avoiding forced 
medication and on the state’s interest in using medication to further its goal 
of implementing a lawfully imposed sentence.127 
Staley, however, has been asymptomatic and has experienced 
manifestations of his illness when medicated.128  Similar to the situation in 
the Singleton case, forcible medication appears to be the only likely way to 
render Staley competent for his execution.129  Nevertheless, akin to the 
Perry case, commuting Staley’s sentence can be seen to offer an alternative 
to fulfilling the state’s goals without inciting this controversy and has been 
done in recent cases.130 
However, both Singleton and Perry were decided before the final ruling 
                                                          
 125. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1024 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Harper’s 
recognition of the dangers of medication’s side effects, which Singleton did not 
experience); State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 760 (La. 1992) (finding that the 
medication’s effects caused greater infringement on bodily integrity than other 
intrusions). 
 126. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 760.  But see Douglas Mossoman, Unbuckling the 
“Chemical Straightjacket”: The Legal Significance of Recent Advances in the 
Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 1068-70 (2002)  
(arguing that newer anti-psychotic medication offers fewer side effects and a lowered 
chance of neurological damage than older drugs). 
 127. Compare Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1025 (finding punishing offenders whose 
crimes justified the death penalty to be paramount and that forcible medication 
provided the only viable means to further this interest), with Perry, 610 So. 2d at 761 
(finding that forcibly medicating Perry did not further the state’s interest when his 
sentence could be commuted). 
 128. Brief for Appellee, supra note 14, at 3, at app. A, at 18. 
 129. See id. at app. A, at 9 (finding that without medication Staley believed he was 
being executed due to a conspiracy involving the judge). 
 130. See Reginald Fields, Ohio Gov. John Kasich Commutes Inmate’s Death 
Sentence to Life in Prison, CLEVELAND.COM, July 10, 2012, 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/07/ohio_governor_commutes_inmates.
html (noting that the Governor of Ohio commuted an inmate’s sentence to life 
imprisonment after the inmate was found to be incompetent); see also Brief for 
Appellant, supra note 12, at 11 (mentioning that many states provide for civil 
commitment after incompetency and others follow an informal practice of dropping 
attempts to execute an inmate). 
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in Sell, where the Court determined that forcible medication must 
significantly further the State’s interest, be unlikely to result in side effects 
that influence a defendant’s ability to assist in his defense, and only be 
administered where no less intrusive alternative exists to further the state’s 
interest.131  Here, forcibly medicating Staley could result in effects that may 
influence his understanding of his punishment and its imminence, and 
therefore it may not further the state’s interest in retribution.132  Staley may 
instead attain competency through a natural remission of his illness or 
through non-drug therapies.133  Yet, commuting his sentence fulfills the 
state’s interest in retribution without requiring this issue to remain in the 
balance.134 
Nevertheless, an argument can be made, as the dissent in Perry noted, 
that the state also has an interest in ensuring that convicted murderers do 
not feign mental illness.135  Indeed, an inmate has an interest in alleging 
mental illness to avoid the death penalty.136  While advancements have 
been made in diagnosing mental illness, absolute faith in a physician’s 
capacity to determine when an inmate is malingering remains misplaced.137 
Nonetheless, malingering mental illness requires high intelligence and 
                                                          
 131. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003) (finding that weighing 
potential side effects with the possibility of alternative treatment including non-drug 
therapies is required).  But see Christopher Slobogin, Sell’s Conundrums: The Right of 
Incompetent Defendants to Refuse Anti-Psychotic Medication, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1523, 
1532 (noting an exception may exist in Sell when an inmate’s guardian can make 
decisions about his medication when the inmate is found to be incompetent). 
 132. Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 14-15. 
 133. See generally Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (noting that alternatives to medication 
including non-drug therapies may establish competency). 
 134. But cf. Ryan v. Gonzales, Nos. 10-930, 11-218, 2013 WL 68690 (January 8, 
2013) (finding that a death row inmate suffering from mental illness may not 
indefinitely stay his habeas proceedings until he is found competent). 
 135. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 780 (La. 1992) (Cole, J., dissenting) 
(finding that the majority ignored the state’s interest in protecting society from capital 
offenders seeking to avoid punishment by feigning mental illness); see also Sell, 539 
U.S. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that weighing alternative treatment options 
could lead defendants to opportunistically refuse medication). 
 136. See generally Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that since Singleton stated that taking medication could be in his interest, his allegation 
that having to take medication after his execution date was set was not in his interest 
reduced to a claim that his punishment is not in his interest). 
 137. See Joseph A. Toomey, The Utility of the MMPI-2 Malingering Discriminant 
Function Index in the Detection of Malingering: A Study of Criminal Defendants, 16 
ASSESSMENT 115, 119 (2009), available at http://asm.sagepub.com/content/16/1/115 
(noting that a predominant test used to determine when a criminal defendant is feigning 
mental illness failed to adequately differentiate those malingering from those who were 
not). 
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knowledge of its diagnostic tests.138  New technology, including brain 
imaging, provides an opportunity to actually see the effects of 
schizophrenia on the brain and thus offers grounds for more effective 
diagnosis.139  That the Court has, at times, given deference to the medical 
community regarding treatment determinations, coupled with the difficulty 
of feigning mental illness, potentially over decades as the appeal process 
endures, supports the notion that the State’s interest in this context is not 
overwhelming.140  Additionally, the physicians in the Staley case all agreed 
that Staley was not malingering.141  It is unlikely that Staley could feign his 
illness for over twenty-one years while he was on death row and thus, it is 
unlikely that the state has an interest in protecting society from his 
avoidance of retribution for his crimes.  
Ultimately, regarding the State’s interest, Sell found that within the 
balancing test between the interest of an individual with mental illness and 
the State, forcible medication must be necessary to further the State’s 
goal.142  That the State, in Staley’s case, stressed its interest in enforcing his 
punishment, which cannot be tied to Staley’s treatment, reinforces the view 
that this scheme is unconstitutional.143  Finally, Staley’s case requires one 
additional safeguard not present in either Sell or Riggins: that the State’s 
interest must be tempered by the safeguards of the Eighth Amendment, 
which is violated when Staley’s treatment, absent his choice, delivers him 
to his punishment.  Given the reality of Staley’s illness and his treatment, 
his forcible medication is unconstitutional because it violates his bodily 
                                                          
 138. See William V. Pelfrey Jr, The Relationship Between Malingerer’s Intelligence 
and MMPI-2 Knowledge and Their Ability to Avoid Detection, 48 INT’L. J. OFFENDER 
THER. COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 649, 655 (2004) (showing that factors including a higher 
IQ and prior MMPI-2 knowledge contribute to the likelihood of an individual 
successfully avoiding detection). 
 139. See Neuroimagining and Mental Illness: A Window Into the Brain, NAT’L INST. 
OF MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/neuroimaging-and-
mental-illness-a-window-into-the-brain/neuroimaging-and-mental-illness-a-window-
into-the-brain.shtml (last visited January 29, 2013) (finding that while brain scans are 
helpful in aiding in diagnosis, they alone cannot diagnose an illness). 
 140. See generally Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222-23, 231-33 (1990) 
(noting that Harper’s forced medication was medically appropriate because it was 
prescribed by a physician who determined it was appropriate treatment); see also Brief 
for Appellee, supra note 14, at app. A, at 5 (noting that Staley was diagnosed with 
schizophrenia in 1993 and thus would have had to have feigned illness for decades 
throughout the appeal process, which was unlikely). 
 141. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 14, at app. A, at 10-11 (describing in 
physicians’ testimonies that they did not believe Staley was malingering because of 
their past experience with Staley). 
 142. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-183 (2003). 
 143. Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 21-22. 
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integrity without significantly furthering a legitimate state interest when 
life in prison without parole remains an alternative.144 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
There are two additional factors that support the argument that Staley’s 
forcible medication is unconstitutional: (1) the forcible medication scheme 
places physicians in too precarious of an ethical situation, and (2) it violates 
conceptions of human dignity and decency to make decisions about an 
inmate’s ability to refuse medication where the inmate can either refuse 
medication and live a life plagued by delusion or accept medication and 
likely be put to death.145 
First, the court in Perry recognized that there is a societal interest in 
preserving the image of medicine as a healing profession that would be 
eroded if physicians consistently faced the dilemma of whether they could 
separate an inmate’s treatment from the reality of his or her punishment.146  
Creating this conflict potentially erodes public trust of physicians who, 
instead of being seen as healers, become too entwined with an inmate’s 
execution.147  Placing physicians in this kind of ethical dilemma raises the 
question of what would occur if physicians refused to prescribe medication 
to these inmates.148  Ultimately, physicians may withdraw their support.149  
Such a situation leaves society wondering when modern standards of 
                                                          
 144. See generally Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (noting the importance of weighing 
alternative and less intrusive treatments capable of achieving substantially the same 
results); see also State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 770 (La. 1992) (quoting a Maryland 
statute that allows trial courts, on remand, to convert death sentences to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole). 
 145. See generally Rhonda K. Jenkins, Fit to Die: Drug-Induced Competency for the 
Purpose of Execution, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 149, 170-73 (1995) (finding that the medical 
ethical dilemma and the precarious message that forcible medication jurisprudence 
sends inmates are underlying issues in this analysis). 
 146. See generally Perry, 610 So. 2d at 761-62 (finding that the state itself also had 
an interest in preserving the integrity of the medical community, which would be 
damaged if physicians were associated with rendering inmates competent for their 
deaths). 
 147. See Lerman, supra note 9, at 1945-46 (noting that society trusts that physicians 
heal, not harm, and thus when physicians “enter the death chamber” and become 
entwined with an inmate’s execution, they damage the general relationship between 
doctors and their patients). 
 148. See id. at 1946-47 (arguing that if physicians ceased to be involved in the 
process of lethal injection, it is foreseeable that the grounds for administering this form 
of the death penalty in the United States would crumble). 
 149. See id. at 1945 (addressing the argument that involvement in the forcible 
medication issue is held to be unethical by the AMA and APA, and conflicts with the 
Hippocratic Oath). 
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decency evolved to allow a punishment that, because it places physicians in 
this dilemma and requires them to act unethically, appears increasingly 
more cruel and unusual.150 
 Additionally, the tension created by the controversy between Perry 
and Singleton is that Singleton ties any admission on the inmate’s part that 
medication is ever in his interest to a justification for his forcible 
medication.151  This dilemma denies an individual with mental illness the 
opportunity to weigh his or her treatment options and determine that at 
times, medication is the best option to alleviate the symptoms of his or her 
illness, while at others medication is not in his or her best interest.152  
Furthermore, it appears to distinctly punish individuals who have the “good 
luck” of not experiencing some of the debilitating effects of medication.153  
Though Perry found that forcible medication prior to execution was 
unconstitutional, by framing the issue solely in terms of the state’s interest 
in Perry’s execution, the Perry court did not address the issue of what 
would occur if medication were justified on other grounds, such as 
dangerousness.154  Perry also roots this opinion in Louisiana law.155  
Nevertheless, the tension between these two cases raises the question of 
whether a punishment reliant on so many varying factors and results could 
ever be anything except arbitrarily enforced.156 
V. CONCLUSION 
If the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals addresses the issue of whether 
Staley’s forcible medication is constitutional, it should rule that such a 
scheme violates both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  To execute 
an inmate who likely can only comprehend the imminence and purpose of 
his punishment prior to his execution due to the forced manipulation of his 
                                                          
 150. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (holding that standards 
of decency and human dignity are embedded within the Eighth Amendment). 
 151. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 152. See generally Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1984)  (recognizing the 
right of an individual with mental illness who is committed to be involved in the course 
of their treatment). 
 153. See Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1027 (noting that because Singleton did not 
experience adverse side effects to his medication, his forcible medication could be in 
his best medical interest). 
 154. See id. at 1035-36 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (noting that Perry tied the 
constitutionality of Perry’s execution to the state’s goal in enforcing his sentence and 
thus presumed that the state did not have an interest in medicating on other grounds). 
 155. See id. at 1026-7 (dismissing the Perry analysis in part because it relied on 
Louisiana’s Constitution). 
 156. See generally Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (noting that 
arbitrary punishment is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment). 
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mind and body by intrusive medication violates the protections of the 
Eighth Amendment.157  Moreover, on the eve of his execution, to forcibly 
inject Staley with dangerous medication that has caused him adverse 
effects, that has been ineffective in treating his illness, and most 
importantly, that he does not want to take, violates Staley’s due process 
rights.158  Ultimately, this issue rests upon a need to respect Staley’s 
fundamental control over his mind and body in an effort not to see him 
merely as a means for the implementation of the state’s ends. 
                                                          
 157. Id. at 421-22 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 158. See generally Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222-23 (1990) (holding that 
for an inmate’s forcible medication to be constitutional it must be medically 
appropriate and thus in the inmate’s best interest). 
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